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ILG Organizer 
"Uretek" has become sort of a legend among union health and 
safety activists. It has all the elements of a good labor s t o ry -
working conditions you wouldn't believe unless and until you saw 
them, a struggle that combined a strike by severely exploited 
workers with a wide array of tactics that eventually grabbed the 
attention of the entire state of Connecticut, and a clear-cut victory 
for both the workers and for health-and-safety activism in New 
England. 
It also included an incident that illustrates the direct connection 
between occupational health and safety and environmental health. 
Sixty workers at Uretek Co. had been on strike for weeks back 
in 1987 over preserving their health. More than half the workforce 
had hepatitis or other liver ailments. As the strike kept people out 
of work, and away from the dimethyl formamide (DMF) that was 
causing their deteriorated health, many people's conditions began 
to improve. That was to be expected. But what was surprising was 
that new cases of hepatitis and other ailments were developing 
among the strikers. Others, after responding to initial treatment, 
regressed. 
Danny Perez, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union 
(ILG) organizer at Uretek, tells the reason: workshoes, which 
workers kept wearing during the strike, were coated with DMF. 
And this stuff was continuing to make workers sick. They were 
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bringing this pollutant right into their own homes. When workers 
got rid of their shoes, they got rid of their hepatitis, headaches, 
dizziness and liver ailments. 
Perez, responding to a tip he got from a social worker, had begun 
investigating conditions at the Uretek plant in New Haven in 
February 1987. What he found were sick workers working 12-hour 
shifts, standing on a concrete floor with no scheduled breaks and 
eating lunch while tending their machines surrounded by toxic 
substances. Ten of the workers had been officially diagnosed as 
having noninfectious hepatitis and 20 more had been diagnosed 
with other liver problems, but everybody had some kind of health 
problem—rashes, headaches, dizziness. 
A couple days of talking with the workers, and Perez had them 
out on strike. At the same time he alerted OSHA to the situation, 
and contacted the state Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP), the city and the state Departments of Health, and the local 
media. The majority Hispanic workforce picketed the plant as 
Uretek tried to keep operating. With sympathetic media coverage, 
the Uretek strike attracted a lot of supporters—neighbors con-
cerned about pollution from the Uretek plant, Latino community 
activists, the mayors of New Haven and Bridgeport, and even the 
state attorney general. 
Perez led the strike and related public campaign before the 
workers at Uretek had officially voted to be represented by the 
ILG. That didn't happen until May 5, when, the ILG won a 
representation election 10 weeks after the strike began. 
By the end of May, the workers ratified their first union contract 
with Uretek—a contract that provided health insurance and that 
immediately increased wages $l-an-hour with another 90 cents 
coming in the next two years (from an average of $4.50 an hour 
to $6.40). The contract also included an array of health-and-safety 
provisions—including mandatory protective equipment and train-
ing, regular medical screening for workers, and a union right to 
periodic inspections. 
During the course of the strike, OSHA and the DEP forced 
Uretek to clean up its act. OSHA levied $480,000 in fines for 179 
violations of the OSH Act—the highest any company in New 
England had ever been fined. And, after facing jail terms through 
action initiated by the DEP, Uretek's top officers agreed to install 
$300,000 worth of anti-pollution equipment to abate the DMF, 
which it uses to coat fabric at its New Haven plant. 
The Uretek strike also succeeded in raising consciousness in 
Connecticut and much of the rest of New England about deteri-
orating occupational safety and health and other working con-
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ditions—particularly for minority and immigrant workers. 
Danny Perez, ILG organizing director in Connecticut, has been 
organizing throughout the state for a number of years now, and 
he finds health and safety a primary issue in most of his organiz-
ing campaigns. With the assistance of Melinda I\ihus, a reporter 
for the New Haven Advocate, LRR interviewed Perez this summer. 
LRR: Why do you think organizing around health and 
safety is so important now? Have conditions deteriorated or 
are workers just more conscious of these issues? 
Perez: Both. Workers themselves have identified health and 
safety as the Number One issue. Workers wonder if they are going 
to come home in the same condition they went to work. Vietnam 
was safer for a soldier than the workplaces of America are for 
American workers. A conservative estimate is that there are 
100,000 work-related deaths each year. 
Health and safety is an extremely strong issue right now. With 
the economy being what it is, with the manufacturing base break-
ing up in this country, cities and states around the country are des-
perate to retain what manufacturing they have, and they're really 
turning their backs on the conditions in which employees exist. 
Health and safety is something of interest to the workers, but 
also to the media. When workers go out on strike for wages, unions 
are often criticized—unfairly—'All you want is money." When we 
focus on health and safety, we do better with getting the media to 
focus on the horror stories of what is going on in some of these 
places. 
Another thing. There was a question asked in an AFL-CIO poll. 
The question was: "Do you think an employer should have the 
right in a strike situation to replace the strikers permanently?" 
60% said the employer should have that right. Now, they asked 
the same question but they were more specific. They said some-
thing like: "Do you think an employer should have the right to 
replace workers permanently if it is a health-and-safety strike?" 
And 100% of respondents said no. So, 60% felt the employer could 
do any goddamn thing he wants, including replacing permanently 
striking workers, but 100% said NOT if it's a health-and-safety 
strike. 
LRR: At Uretek before the union came in, half the work-
force of 60 had hepatitis and other liver ailments. How bad 
were things, and how are they now? 
Perez: The conditions were horrible, but I don't want to dwell 
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on it. The company has lived up to the contract. There are 22 pages 
of health and safety language. The owner testified at the state 
legislature that the contract has been good in protecting their 
workers and they can live with it. They saw the writing on the 
wall. They understood the ILG is not out to hang them—we just 
wanted to make Uretek a safe place to work. 
LRR: There are a number of elements in the Uretek cam-
paign we'd like to ask you about. Let's start with OSHA. 
Unlike many other situations we know, OSHA seems to have 
acted pretty effectively at Uretek. Why was that? Did you 
do something to light a fire under them? 
Perez: Precisely. But in criticizing OSHA we have to be careful 
in criticizing the local OSHA people that have no control over 
national OSHA policy. As an example, if Hartford's OSHA office 
needs 15 industrial hygienists to do its job and it's only got 3, then 
the criticism has to be laid on the OSHA administation in Washing-
ton—the Republican administration that has decimated OSHA. So, 
we have to be careful who we're criticizing here because in 
Connecticut I believe that the local OSHA people are doing the 
very best they can with what they've got. 
LRR: Sor all that was necessary was for you to inform the 
local OSHA? Were there other things you did? 
Perez: Well, you have to remember that a lot of organizers don't 
know how to utilize OSHA. They think you can get on the phone 
and say, "Hey, this is happening in such-and-such a place and we 
want you to investigate." It doesn't work that way. The most effec-
tive way to get OSHA off its duff is to take workers down there 
and have workers sign an affidavit, a complaint, that the condi-
tions where they work are dangerous and unsafe—and, in parti-
cular, that workers are getting sick, workers are having serious 
accidents there. Now, once you do that, OSHA has to react. 
Whether they have two people or 500 people, they've got to 
respond to that. And, if they don't, then you have the media. You 
can go to the media and say, "This is happening in such-and-such 
a place and we went to such-and-such an agency, and such-and-
such an agency has not responded, or ignored us." Let me tell you 
something. If you understand the media, the media has an insati-
able appetite for information. And that's information. That's a story. 
LRR: How did the state's Department of Environmental 
Protection get involved? 
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. . . Danny Perez talking with Uretek workers. 
Perez: We had called the various regulatory people in Connec-
ticut. And, don't forget, this is now front-page stuff in Connec-
ticut, and it's on television practically every night. And the local 
politicians are now, during an election year in Connecticut, 
extremely concerned about what's happening in their area. And, 
with all this background, when you call the regulatory people, they 
respond very quickly. 
And, on top of that, the attorney general—now U.S. Senator Joe 
Lieberman—called me and said he was arranging a meeting with 
the mayor of New Haven and all the regulatory agencies, and he 
invited me to that meeting. So, now we have the attorney general 
responding to the crisis, we have the local mayor going to the 
attorney general for help, and the attorney general has on the 
carpet all the regulatory people, and is asking, "What the hell is 
going on here." So, when you get support at that level, and you 
get the media responding to a crisis that's not supposed to happen 
in 20th Century America, you know, the shit hits the fan, things 
start to happen. 
LRR: The strike got a lot of community support. How did 
that come about? 
Perez: Because the community was involved in this also. I mean 
there was some test-taking—soil samples taken—in the commu-
nity, in the immediate area, and there was some contamination 
in the soil. Plus, we, the ILG, went to community meetings, 
churches and homes, and we kept the communities involved as 
to not only what the ILG was doing, but what the regulatory 
people were saying, what they were finding, and what they were 
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doing. And we made recommendations to these community 
groups as to what action they could take. 
LRR: The Uretek strike was not economic. It was an unfair 
labor practice (ULP) strike, which meant the strikers could 
not be permanently replaced. What was the ULP—the health 
conditions in the plant? 
Perez: No, that's not a ULP. The ULP was that after my visits 
to the plant in the evenings got to management, management—as 
they normally do—went around threatening workers with dis-
missal or even closing the plant down if the union came into 
Uretek. Now, that's protected activity, and the law says the 
employer has no right to do that. We can't force the union on 
workers, and the employer can't prevent workers from forming 
their own union—that's a God-given right in this country. 
LRR: But you purposely waited until an unfair labor prac-
tice was committed in order to make it a ULP strike? 
Perez: You don't have to wait! You don't have to wait for an 
unfair labor practice. The employers automatically do it. It hap-
pens. It happens the first day the employer finds out the union 
is involved in organizing its workers. 
LRR: At one point during the strike, you organized a 
demonstration at Uretek's owner's home in a fancy suburb. 
Does that kind of stuff really have any impact? 
Perez: Of course it does. It was probably the most difficult thing 
to do, I mean for me personally, to go to someone's home. But 
this guy was not responding to phone calls, this guy was ignoring 
our pleas to sit down to try to find some common ground by which 
we could resolve this serious health problem that existed. Since 
he didn't come to us, we decided to go to him. 
When we strike a company, we're telling the employer: "You 
don't give a damn about what our workers take home. We're going 
to show you that we don't care about what we take to your house. 
To take a demonstration to your house is to let you know how 
we feel when your irresponsible decisions cause problems in our 
homes.'' 
LRR: You took the workers at Uretek out on strike before 
they were members of the union. Was that just an organiz-
ing tactic in this particular situation or does it reflect your 
basic philosophy of organizing? 
Perez: That decision was made as much to save those workers 
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from further health problems as it was a strategic decision to 
protect their rights. 
LRR: You've been quoted as being critical of a "hot shop/' 
hit-and-run approach to organizing, contrasting it to a long-
term, community-oriented approach. But Uretek sure as hell 
was a hot shop, wasn't it? How is your approach different 
from the traditional one? 
Perez: Well, I don't think that the labor movement in this 
country can make the impact that it was destined to make unless 
we start involving ourselves with the entire community. By that 
I mean the churches, for example. I mean, look at the black 
churches in this country. Where have most of the black leaders 
come from? Where did Malcolm X come from? Where did Martin 
Luther King and Jesse Jackson come from? Churches. The labor 
movement has to start getting involved with the workforce out-
side of the workplace. 
You've got to be there for people, regardless of whether you're 
organizing them or not. That's the philosophy of the International 
Ladies Garment Workers. We feel that we're the advocate for 
union and nonunion workers. You don't have to be a do-gooder 
to be upset over a place that has reckless management that causes 
accidents that kill their employees. I think it's the responsibility 
of all working people, union or nonunion, to get involved in a shop 
like that and to do something about it. To do that, you have to 
network in the community, you have to be involved in the com-
munity, you have to know the movers, the people that create 
change. You have to live with these people so that when you have 
to organize an effort, you can do it. 
For example, you can't go up to a newspaper reporter and say, 
"Hey, I got this story" and he doesn't know who the hell he's talk-
ing to. You should know that guy, you should have a relationship 
with him, you should have a few beers with him, you should know 
his family, he should know your family. He should know a lot 
about you so that when you tell him that you got something 
important you want to talk about, he'll take you seriously. And 
the same thing for community leaders. 
Uretek involved everybody. My essential point is that when the 
union is up against the company on its own, it's going to lose. At 
Uretek everybody was involved—the attorney general, the mayor, 
mayors from other towns, the people who lived in the area, the 
churches, all the regulatory people. So this company was up against 
the entire society almost. This was not just a labor dispute. This 
was society, or the community, trying to right a wrong, collectively. 
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LRR: You organize mostly Hispanic workers. Is there a 
correlation between a mostly-minority workforce and terri-
ble working conditions? 
Perez: I have yet to go any place in Connecticut where I see 
a dirty filthy building, with 55-gallon chemical drums all over the 
place, where I don't find immigrant workers, undocumented 
workers. 
LRR: Are undocumented workers harder to organize, for 
fear of being deported if they speak up? 
Perez: Not necessarily. Undocumented workers will strike 
because they have a labor history in their country. You go into 
any shop with Chilenos and they will organize the shop for you. 
They have a strong history and consciousness. 
LRR: What about Puerto Ricans, who are the largest 
Hispanic group in Connecticut, and who are U.S. citizens? 
Perez: There are three kinds of Puerto Ricans—the one who 
was born here, who grew up here and who will die here, and who 
gets involves in what's happening here, like me; the one who was 
born in Puerto Rico, and will live and die there, and gets involved 
in what's happening there; and the one who lives in an airplane 
(going back and forth]. He is the most difficult to get involved in 
struggles. They are tourists. We want them to get involved and 
participate. 
LRR: You've been focusing lately on Acme, another plant 
in New Haven with a largely Hispanic workforce, where a 
worker was killed last year. 
Perez: We lost an election there by one vote three or four years 
ago. I pedicted there would be a serious accident. Norberto 
Miranda died. (State Rep. and candidate for attorney general] Jay 
Levin called it murder. He called for an investigation by the state 
attorney general and the U.S. attorney. 
LRR: Where's that campaign at now? 
Perez: It's stalled simply because it's up to the workers. It's their 
campaign, it's their decision to make, and it's their fight. I'm not 
the one that's suffering there. And for some workers, the workers 
we're attempting to organize, it's extremely difficult to find work, 
extremely difficult to change jobs or seek new employment. And 
while the pay at Acme is not all that bad, the working conditions 
are. And the worker who's unskilled and doesn't have a lot of 
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formal education will trade off, sometimes, that higher pay for 
health and safety—until it just gets to be so intolerable that they'll 
respond. 
At Acme I talked myself blue in the face. Some of those workers 
are making 11 bucks an hour, and they cannot make that anyplace 
else. And, on top of that they've done enormous things to that 
place since our campaign, which benefits the workers. They've 
put (safety) guards on everything, they've had all kinds of con-
sultants come in there, safety engineers and all that. Which is fine, 
as long as the place gets better. We would like to organize it, but 
at least they can no longer operate the way they were. 
LRR: You've also got a campaign now at Hartford Feance, 
a procelain manufacturer. Is health and safety a major issue 
there too? 
Perez: Yes, it was and OSHA responded. In all these campaigns 
OSHA has responded. And there's not a place that OSHA goes 
that we're not involved with, not a place where they levy cita-
tions on the company—as they did at Hartford Feance—that we're 
not active. And we were successful in organizing that shop. Feance 
is now an International Ladies Garment Workers shop. 
LRR: Conditions in the garment industry and in other 
labor-intensive industries have really deteriorated in the last 
10 years. Sweatshops, child labor, homework—conditions we 
thought were "history" in this country. What needs to hap-
pen in order to reverse directions? 
Perez: Workers are practically brain-dead in this country. No 
one knows what their rights are. After the shaft they are getting, 
you have to think one of two things: They are immune to pain, 
or they don't give a damn. The ladder of success is bullshit. Twenty 
years ago minimum wage was $ 1.60. If you went to the store today 
to buy what you could for that (then], you'd need $7. In Japan 
the differences between a factory worker and top management 
in salary is like 8-to-l. In this country, it's gone to 93-to-l. 
There's been this tremendous shift in wealth in this country, 
which almost makes it impossible today for a factory worker to 
own a home—can you imagine that? I've been in shops where 
people work three jobs. The system has learned to keep a very 
fine balance between starvation and anarchy, to keep you just 
above the line where you can just barely survive. We have to stop 
work in this country for just one day to remind Congress that we 
exist, that we are still around, that we are somebody. • 
